
Globalisation and Skills for Development: some lessons from sub-Saharan Africa

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ABSTRACT This article reports on an international policy research study funded by the United Kingdom (UK) Government's Department for International Development (DfID), entitled *Globalisation and Skills for Development in Tanzania and Rwanda: implications for education and training policy and practice*. The research is a contribution to a broader 'Skills for Development Initiative' launched by the UK Secretary of State for International Development (Short, 1999). The study was a collaborative effort between the Universities of Bristol, Bath, Dar es Salaam and the Kigali Institute of Education. The findings and the analysis generated by this research are rich and complex.

Introduction

The overall aim of the research was to create a context-relevant knowledge base about the implications for education and training policy of globalisation in two low income sub-Saharan African countries. Two key hypotheses were derived from this overall aim:

1. Globalisation has radically different implications for skills development in low income countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania compared to Western industrialised countries and the newly industrialised countries of the Pacific Rim.
2. Tanzania and Rwanda are likely to be similar in their responses to the four policy tensions or pressure points identified in the literature review.

Although there is a growing body of literature dealing with globalisation and skills for development in high income countries, there is a much more limited literature concerned with low income countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania. Where this literature does exist, it is based on limited empirical

evidence. The literature also commonly assumes that the implications for globalisation are uniform across low income countries. This is despite the observation that although countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania do share similarities, they are also structured differently in their relationships with the outside world.

There is also a danger in assuming that the opportunities and threats posed by globalisation are similar for different sectors of the economy and for different sections of the population *within* countries. Far from having an homogenous set of implications, globalisation in fact represents a series of tensions and trade-offs for policy makers as governments attempt to balance competing perceptions, needs and interests. Moreover, different governments choose different policy priorities. If governments are to adopt an effective skills for development strategy that will benefit the dual aims of economic growth and poverty alleviation, this must be based on a prior understanding of these differing perceptions, needs and interests.

Finally, there is a need to develop a notion of 'skills' that is both context sensitive and relevant to the changing needs of a globalising economy. For example, it became apparent to us that existing notions of 'skills for development' often rely on an underlying view of skills as possessing a universal form and currency and do not take sufficient account of the context in which they are acquired and in which they operate. Our concern to understand the implications of globalisation in terms of policy tensions and in relation to a context-sensitive view of skills themselves, led us to adopt a 'skills formation' approach in order to understand skills for development.

The 'Skills Formation' Approach

By skills formation we mean the development of the 'social capacity for learning, innovation and productivity' (Brown, 1999, p. 233). Thus, rather than seeing skill acquisition simply as a 'technical issue' (in the way that manpower planning and human capital approaches have tended to do in the past), this approach aims to take account of the economic, political and cultural contexts within which skills are defined and learned. Skills themselves are understood to be more than just narrow technical competencies but also include interpersonal, communications, teamwork and creative skills. Both the learning of skills and their practice are acknowledged to be inherently social rather than individual in nature.

Underlying the approach is the identification of key 'pressure points' which provide a framework for understanding the policy tensions inherent in a skills for development strategy and the differing preferences of key stakeholders. This framework draws on work by Phillip Brown and his colleagues (Brown, 1999; Brown et al, 2001) but extends this from their original focus on high income economies to demonstrate its relevance for Africa. This necessarily entails taking into account aspects of the colonial legacy in education and training, a recognition of the vastly different learning

contexts linked to different socio-economic environments in Africa compared to the 'high skills economies', and the importance of poverty alleviation, gender relations and of cultural issues such as language. In order to do this we have found it necessary to reformulate somewhat the pressure points identified by Brown et al.

The *first pressure point* concerns how different individuals and groups within a specific country understand skill formation in relation to national development priorities and the changing role of the State and the private sector in providing skills for development opportunities. The recognition of this pressure point turns the spotlight on differing perspectives within a country in relation to economic priorities in the context of globalisation based on regional, economic, political or other interests. The *second pressure point* concerns the capacity of education and training systems to deliver the skills required. Here research needs to take account of the colonial and postcolonial legacies in the provision of education and training that differ between countries.

The *third pressure point* focuses on global competition versus social and economic inclusion, i.e. whether the skills required to foster global competitiveness are the same as those required to promote social inclusion and to eliminate poverty. Too much emphasis on high skills is likely to favour middle-class urban elites, while basic and vocational skills (along with many of the generic and transferable skills identified) may be found to be crucial for poor, rural communities. It is not just a question, therefore, of what skills are prioritised within a skills-formation strategy, but also who has access to different types and levels of skills. The *fourth pressure point* concerns the extent to which existing cultural norms and values encourage or provide a block to skill formation. The impact of cultural norms and values on skills formation strategies has become increasingly significant, partly because of the growing interest expressed by the World Bank and other important global institutions in notions of 'social capital'. There is a possible tension here, however, between acknowledging traditional cultural beliefs and values, such as those inherent in some religious schools and institutions, teaching about diversity, and encouraging skills such as critical thinking that are identified in the literature as being necessary for fostering innovation and change. This pressure point also draws attention to the need in the post-colonial context to engage with the issue of language in relation to skills formation.

Research Methods

Data to meet the research aims were collected from four sources:

1. An analysis of key documents from both countries on development strategies and on education and training policy.
2. Individual interviews with key stakeholders in both countries, chosen to represent a range of perspectives on globalisation and its implications for national development and skill requirements: senior officials from key

ministries and representatives from donor organisations, civil society, local and multinational business interests and organised labour, including the teaching profession.

3. Group interviews with key rural stakeholders, including farmers, artisans, local government officials and rural non-governmental organisations.

4. National workshop consultations, held separately in each country at the beginning of the research, and then a combined workshop for participants from both countries toward the end of the research to obtain feedback on provisional reports on the research outcomes.

The National Contexts

A more detailed account of the historical, political, economic and demographic contexts of Rwanda and Tanzania is given in the original research reports for this project (Tikly et al, 2002; Mukabaranga et al, 2002; Dachi et al, 2002). For the purposes of this article, some key points of similarity and difference are briefly noted here.

Rwanda and Tanzania are amongst the poorest countries in the world. They are ranked as the 12th and 22nd most underdeveloped nations according to the Human Development Index. Both are heavily dependent on agriculture; however, in both countries there has been some growth in the service sector including financial and business services. Nonetheless the economy of both countries is very much affected by low agricultural productivity. Both also have low human resource development and low employment opportunities. In Tanzania, unemployment has been exacerbated since the 1990s by cuts in the public service workforce associated with privatisation. Both countries continue to experience high population growth and, in Rwanda's case, one of the highest population densities in the world. Rwanda is also recovering from the after-effects of the 1994 genocide, in which up to one million people lost their lives. Both countries have a weak export base. This is made worse for the Rwandan economy by high transport costs associated with it being a landlocked country. Both countries are vulnerable to external price shocks and suffer from a narrow revenue base and low economic growth. Rwanda and Tanzania have an external debt of 1.4 and 8 billion US dollars, representing 75% and 100% of Gross Domestic Product respectively.

Both countries inherited an education system introduced by the colonial powers (Belgium and the United Kingdom (UK) respectively) and run by the missionaries, that was based on some form of 'adapted education' and geared towards the production of basic skills, mainly at primary level. Access to secondary and tertiary education was extremely limited and aimed at preparing a small cadre of indigenous personnel to serve the colonial administration, work as teachers or nurses or join the clergy. In Rwanda's case, education was also ethnically exclusivist in favour of the Tutsi minority. In the post-independence phase, quotas were introduced by the Hutu-led government in favour of Hutus. In both countries there was expansion of

primary education and a more limited expansion of secondary and tertiary education following independence, although access to these sectors remained confined to an elite. Whereas the Tanzanian school curriculum was influenced by the post-independence Philosophy of Education for Self-reliance which emphasised local priorities, the Rwandan curriculum maintained a highly academic and Eurocentric bias. In line with global development agendas, both countries are currently working towards the education development targets and are seeking to gear their education and training systems to the realities of globalisation.

Globalisation in the Literature

The UK Department for International Development (DfID) (2000A) has defined globalisation as:

The growing interdependence and interconnectedness of the modern world through increased flows of goods, services, capital, people and information. The process is driven by technological advances and reductions in the costs of international transactions, which spread technology and ideas, raise the share of trade in world production and increase the mobility of capital (p. 1).

Although this definition provided a valuable starting point for our own research its focus is more on the economic and technological aspects of globalisation. As educationalists we are also interested in the implications of cultural and political globalisation for skills development. Further, given our focus on low income countries largely on the periphery of the major global flows and networks, we were keen to develop an appreciation of globalisation as it impacts on these contexts in particular.

Held et al (1999) identify three ways of understanding globalisation, each of which has different implications for education. Firstly, the 'hyperglobalist tendency' suggests that we are in a new 'global age' characterised by the emergence of a 'global village' or common global culture. The second 'sceptical tendency' that they identify, however, challenges this, arguing that globalisation is nothing new, that global flows and networks were in fact greater during colonial times and, that global capitalism is leading to greater polarisation between and within nation-states. Their third tendency, labelled the 'transformationalist approach', is the one closest to our own understanding. It assumes previous eras of globalisation but argues that contemporary global flows and networks are unprecedented in the extent to which they are transforming global economics, politics and culture. Unlike the hyperglobalist view, however, the effects of these processes are complex and contradictory rather than linear and so are experienced unevenly.

Together with Collier & Dollar (2002), Held et al (1999) argue that international and global interconnectedness is by no means a novel phenomenon. They argue that contemporary globalisation is historically unprecedented in terms of its extensity, intensity, velocity and impact.

Contemporary globalisation has involved a massive increase in migrations of populations, the increasing significance and impact of environmental issues and concerns and developments in mass media and technologies. It involves the emergence of a growing worldwide elite as well as popular consciousness of global interconnectedness. It is also contested as states, citizens and social movements resist or manage its impacts.

A recent example of an attempt to articulate a specifically African response to globalisation is the debate around the concept of the 'African Renaissance' (Tikly & Memella, 2002). Put in its simplest terms, the African Renaissance implies a rebirth of Africa in economic, political and cultural terms and by providing an account of Africa's priorities in relation to globalisation, it has major implications for skills for development. In contrast to the so-called 'hyperglobalist' perspective (see above), many commentators perceive globalisation as a set of processes rather than a single condition involving interactions and networks within the political, military, economic and cultural domains as well as those of labour and migratory movements and of the environment (see Held et al, 1999; Giddens, 1999 for example). It is often at the intersection of these different global influences that the current realities of African education are best grasped (Tikly, 2001). However, although all of the aspects of globalisation outlined so far impact on education to some extent in low income countries, most commentators have focused on the implications for education of economic, political and cultural global flows and networks. We shall consider these implications briefly below.

Economic Globalisation

For DfID (2000a) and for authors such as Collier & Dollar (2002), globalisation means integration into global economic flows and networks. This understanding of economic globalisation can be traced back to Robert Reich's (1991) seminal work on the impact of the changing global economy. It is this integration that has generated anxieties about rising inequality, shifting power, and cultural uniformity. Hoogvelt (1997) points out that the 'financial deepening' of globalisation has involved the concentration and increased flow of capital within a geographically confined area including the western and newly industrialised countries and excluding large swathes of sub-Saharan Africa. For these countries on the margins of the emerging global system, it is instructive to consider how the literature envisages their development and possible future insertion into the global economy.

We can distinguish two perspectives on how low income countries can become more integrated into contemporary economic flows and networks. The first of these is an evolutionary or gradualist approach, which takes as given the developmental route historically followed by the countries of the North and, so it is claimed, by the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs) of East Asia too. The first step in this route is the modernisation and diversification of agriculture and the development of agriculture-based

industries, together with other forms of support activity based on relatively low-technology crafts and artisan skills. This is followed, by labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturing, in turn to be followed by moves into higher-value-added, higher-skill, more capital-intensive industry. The final goal is a move into the high-skills, advanced technology, knowledge-based sector, in both manufacturing and services. This model often remains implicit in many accounts where the focus remains firmly on the early stages of the process as a means of alleviating or eliminating existing poverty, while future development remains unspecified with any precision (e.g. World Bank, 2000; DfID, 2000a).

The second perspective is one which not only contemplates but argues the necessity for an economic development strategy that 'leapfrogs' the historical stages of development elsewhere. DfID (2000a), for example, refers to the potential for leapfrogging the development trajectory of industrialised countries through the use of new technologies that offer access to knowledge and links to the global economy. The driving force behind this approach is ultimately a perception of fundamental changes in context that are being wrought by increasing globalisation. This perspective is the one shared by the Rwandan Government (see below).

Within the framework of the African Renaissance, some commentators (Mazrui, 1999; Adedeji, 1998; Mayer, 1998) have suggested that African economies can respond to their position of marginalisation from economic globalisation by diversifying their industrial base and export markets, and hence becoming less dependant on domestic markets and foreign imports. Mayer, for example, has argued that greater trade integration along regional lines should be used by regions to promote such diversification as well as to attract investment (domestic, regional and foreign) and to ensure an equitable distribution of the gains of trade integration between countries. She also makes the case for greater specialisation within regions, i.e. for countries within a region to specialise in the production of goods that they can produce competitively.

Political Globalisation

All countries have experienced an increase in global and regional influences over education policy and a proliferation of mechanisms through which these influences have been brought to bear (Dale, 1999). In most high income, Western countries, however, the nation-state remains the main locus of decision making over areas of social policy, including education (Green, 1997). This is less the case in low income countries where the influence of multilateral and donor agencies has been increasing since the 1980s through the mechanism of conditional lending (Samoff, 1994, 1999; Dale, 1999; Tikly, 2001).

One response to the demands of globalisation has been for the State to play a leading and regulatory role in the economy and to see itself as the main, if not sole, provider of services such as education and training for the public

good (the welfare model). The countries of the Pacific Rim, for example, have followed a state-led regulatory path, with authoritarian regimes and a social agenda aimed at nation building (Green, 1997). Many postcolonial states in Africa, including Rwanda and Tanzania, also pursued a state-led model of development following independence although this was hampered by the phenomenon of the 'weak state' (Clapham, 1997), i.e. a state characterised by over-centralised and inefficient bureaucracies, poor governance and little influence in the context of international relations. Nonetheless, any post-colonial governments saw themselves as playing a crucial role in regulating and protecting internal markets, securing employment and remaining the principle provider of services including health and education (it was this notion of the State that underpinned the idea of 'self reliance' in Tanzania, for example).

The dominant response to globalisation during the 1980s, however, was the neo-liberal response in which some Western governments, most notably those of the UK and USA, sought to reduce the economic management role of government, to privatise public sector activities and to produce an ideal of the low-taxation, low spending and laissez-faire state. The neo-liberal model also formed the basis of the so-called 'Washington consensus', which provided a normative framework for the US Government, its allies and key multilateral and donor agencies in their dealings with Africa and other low income countries and regions (Gore, 2000; Fine, 2001).

Like the neo-liberal approach of the 1980s in Western countries, the 'Washington consensus' has also increasingly come under strain. Structural adjustment policies have been criticised for exacerbating rather than reducing poverty (see Gore, 2000; Samoff et al, 1994; Muganda, 2001 for example). It has also been criticised for producing what Carnoy (1999) describes as a 'globalised bureaucratic state', i.e. a state that is reduced to responding bureaucratically to the demands of global forces and donor agendas rather than advancing an indigenous response. In this respect, the emerging 'post-Washington consensus', that is increasingly providing a normative framework for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor community is, according to Gore (2000), aimed at broader objectives than the achievement of a free market economy (the objective of neo-liberal economics), including a focus on the living standards of people and the promotion of 'equitable, sustainable and democratic development'. The State is envisaged in some of these discourses as having a more reduced role than the old welfarist model but also a more strategic, enabling and regulatory role than the neo-liberal model allows for.

Adopting the African Renaissance view on the importance of the regional level in relation to African development, writers such as Ajulu (2001) and Mayer (1998) have drawn on the idea of 'developmental regionalism' as a means of securing African interests. At the heart of this concept is the view that successful participation in the global economy might most effectively be achieved through participation in regional trading blocks that are more able to

attract foreign investors whilst being more able to intervene in the market than individual nation-states. Indeed, both Rwanda and Tanzania are members of both the Southern African Development Community and the East and Southern African Community, a point that was considered significant by many of the research participants as we shall see below.

Cultural Globalisation

Hall (1992, 1996) and Hoogvelt (1997) have commented on how processes of migration, diaspora formation and cultural hybridisation have transformed individual and group identities and created 'new ethnicities' based on fluid rather than fixed cultural attributes. In the African context these processes appear contradictory and partial in their effects. The impact of foreign culture has increased in many African countries as a consequence of the advent of mass media, including the Internet. War, famine and poverty on the subcontinent have also led to a growing number of refugees and have accelerated processes of migration between countries and between rural and urban areas. This has inevitably entailed the development of cultural 'melting pots', particularly in the urban areas.

In sub-Saharan Africa, education continues to play a key role in relation to culture and ethnic politics. As some writers have pointed out, the challenges of changing cultural identities and the legacy of ethnic conflict pose new challenges for educational planners and policy makers, who must find new ways of working with diversity and difference in the curriculum. This is particularly important in countries such as Rwanda, where access to educational opportunities has itself been a contributing factor to ethnic conflict in the past. In some countries, decentralisation has provided one mechanism for ensuring a greater say for communities, whether defined in cultural, geographical, linguistic or religious terms. As Carnoy (1999) points out, however, central government still has a key role to play in 'levelling the playing fields' in terms of opportunities afforded to different groups.

Negotiating issues of language, identity and power is critical in the African context. Rassool (1998) and Pennycook (1995) have described the difficulties and ambiguities facing language policy formulation in relation to indigenous and former colonial languages, particularly in the context of globalisation and access to global networks. In relation to the idea of an African Renaissance, it has been observed that no country has become globally competitive without nurturing indigenous languages (Mazrui, 1999). Africa provides rich examples of policies concerned at negotiating language rights in the era of contemporary globalisation as exemplified by the Swahili experiment in Tanzania, the official languages policy in South Africa and the trilingual approach adopted by Cameroon (Tikly & Memella, 2002).

Rwanda and Tanzania in a Globalising World

Informants' Views on Globalisation and Its Implications for National Development

The overall view of globalisation put forward by the research informants in both countries saw globalisation as containing both opportunities and threats for national development but as being an inevitable and largely irresistible phenomenon. In this latter respect, the informants were rejecting the sceptical approach outlined by Held et al (1999). On the other hand, only a few offered the 'hyperglobalist' perspective of the creation of a global village and global culture in which Rwanda and Tanzania would be equal partners in a two-way process. Most informants tended towards a more nuanced understanding of globalisation as a set of contradictory processes with unequal consequences for rich and poor countries and for different groups within countries, an understanding similar to that described by Held et al as 'transformationalist'.

Globalisation was seen to be concerned principally with economic integration into regional and global markets underpinned by new technologies. It was also seen, however, as involving political and cultural aspects. Informants from the urban educated elite tend to emphasise the economic opportunities generated by globalisation, while recognising the dangers of intensified external influence through, for example, the role of international agencies in sector-wide approaches to planning and development. Informants commenting from more marginalised rural contexts were more likely to highlight the economic and cultural threats of the global penetration of dominant Western goods and values. Both countries were universally seen as being in a weak position in relation to global forces but as having something to contribute to an emerging global economy and culture.

Two Government Visions of National Development in a Globalising Future

The governments of both countries in this study have recently produced documents putting forward their respective visions of national development over the next 2 decades or so, entitled *Vision 2020* and *Vision 2025* for Rwanda and Tanzania respectively (Ministry of Finance, 2000; United Republic of Tanzania, 1999).

Rwanda's vision in a nutshell

By the year 2020 Rwanda will transform itself from a low income economy based on agriculture to a middle income economy that will act as a communications hub and service provider for the region.

Tanzania's vision in a nutshell

By the year 2025 Tanzania will have transformed itself into a middle income country through modernising the agricultural sector in a way that can sustain the livelihoods of all Tanzanians and through facilitating the growth of a strong and globally competitive industrial sector.

The two visions share common characteristics. Both are based on:

- a recognition of the inevitability of globalisation and of the need for the two countries to globalise;
- a common aim of becoming a middle income country by the end of the duration of the vision;
- a similar view of the need to modernise the agricultural sector;
- the need to create macroeconomic stability as a basis for attracting foreign direct investment;
- the need to develop the information and communications technology (ICT) and science and technology infrastructure;
- the central role of human resources and of education and training in national development;
- a shared view of the changing role of the State in relation to national development more in line with the idea of the enabling or facilitating state in the literature;
- the need for a fundamental change in the mindset of the population, i.e. that the populations of the two countries need to become more competitive and entrepreneurial;
- the need for good governance as a prerequisite for development;
- both visions emphasise the importance of national unity;
- both seek to reduce dependency on aid.

The visions also contain some important differences. These can be related to the historical contexts of the two countries as well as to demographic and geographic realities. For example, although both visions can be seen to lie within the terms of the so-called 'post-Washington consensus' and are concerned with alleviating poverty, the Tanzanian vision is more explicit about the need to improve the quality of livelihoods of the rural poor than is the case with the Rwandan vision. It also draws on the philosophy of self-reliance as a means to counter donor dependency. These aspects provide continuity on the trajectory of post-independence government ideology in Tanzania, reflected for example, in the Arusha Declaration. By way of contrast the Rwandan vision is more explicit about the need to create an entrepreneurial middle class as the driving force for development, reflecting a stronger neo-liberal bias. Further, whereas the Rwandan vision seeks to leapfrog the industrialisation phase and become a knowledge-based economy, the Tanzanian vision adopts a more evolutionary approach based on a modernised agricultural sector and the gradual development of the industrial

and services sector. In part this can be attributed to the potentially greater productivity of the Tanzanian agricultural sector, the high population density in Rwanda and to other factors. In this respect, although the development of ICT infrastructure and of human resources is central to the vision of both countries, it is arguably even more critical for Rwanda given its aim of becoming a knowledge-based economy by 2020.

Two Models of Development from the Data

At some risk of oversimplification, the above account of the implications of globalisation in Rwanda and Tanzania can be reduced to two contrasting developmental models. These should be recognised as 'ideal types', useful for analytical purposes, rather than representing exclusive options. We stress that the models are derived from the data as a whole rather than representing the views of specific stakeholders or policy documents (although different stakeholders or policy documents may be more or less biased towards one particular model). As such they represent two ends of a continuum. They do, however, serve to emphasise some of the tensions or pressure points (Brown, 1999) facing policy makers dealing with the issues of skills for development. They can be conveniently labelled as the 'localised' and the 'globalised' paths.

Localised Path

- Prioritisation of skill development in traditional sectors such as agriculture;
- protection of internal markets;
- limited diversification of the economy;
- prioritisation of the reduction of extreme poverty;
- major focus on basic education for literacy and numeracy;
- some new technology, but an emphasis on development of 'appropriate' technologies;
- the State provides services and infrastructure and protects internal markets.

Globalised Path

- Prioritisation of skill development for export-oriented production and to attract foreign investment;
- openness to international markets and competition;
- diversification of the economy into new sectors;
- the development of a new entrepreneurial and technical middle class;
- more balanced expansion of education that includes higher education in key areas;
- introduction of advanced technologies within a coherent technology policy framework;
- the State as a catalyst for diversification into sectors that can provide international comparative advantage, and as an enabler of market operation.

One way of viewing the models is in terms of a progression. In this respect, the first model describes how successive post-colonial administrations have tackled national development historically. It is also possible to envisage how in the short-term drive to eliminate poverty, elements of the first path might seem more appropriate. In the same vein, both the Rwandan and Tanzanian Governments have acknowledged the necessity to move rapidly towards a more globalised development path. What is most important, however, is the nature of the articulation or link between the two models. Both governments are clearly intent on meeting immediate poverty alleviation needs (which imply elements of the first model), but laying the basis for the globalised model must also start immediately. This means, for example, opening up markets to outside investment and competition and encouraging an active role for the private sector in national development, even in the short term. It also means putting in place an ICT strategy and investing in higher-level skills. The implications of the two models for skills development are discussed in more detail in the next section.

In developing their own visions of national development, the Governments of Rwanda and Tanzania have adopted the globalised model and have acknowledged that there can be no turning back to a localised model. Nonetheless, there are differences in the visions of national development put forward by both countries related to their specific contexts and histories. The Rwandan Government wishes Rwanda to leapfrog the industrialised stage of development and to become a communications hub and provider of services for the region. This vision acknowledges Rwanda's weak agricultural base and geographic realities such as large distances to the sea, that make traditional industrialisation costly. Tanzania, on the other hand, has adopted a more evolutionary model of development. Its vision is focused on the modernisation of its potentially strong agricultural sector and more traditional industrialisation with an expansion of services. Both countries are also sensitive to changes in global economy and the opening up of new niches, for example, in the production of garments, and the need to build in some flexibility into their visions.

Skills Requirements for Globalisation

Views from the Literature

Two broad developmental strategies were earlier identified: the evolutionary and the leapfrog strategy. Skill development in the first of these strategies focuses initially on low-level skills, in agriculture or in low-skill, labour-intensive manufacturing. Only a limited range and number of high-skilled workers are initially needed and demand for high skills will grow only slowly. Basic literacy and numeracy, with some science, are deemed to provide an adequate base to support acquisition of low skills and within education the

priority is firmly focused on developing primary education (World Bank, 1999).

Riddell (1996) identifies three arguments behind this overwhelming emphasis on primary education:

- positive correlation between primary schooling and developmental indicators such as child health and agricultural productivity;
- rate of return analyses that show the highest rates going to primary education;
- the experience of the newly industrialised economies of East Asia, in which almost universal primary education preceded industrial expansion.

She argues that the first two of these arguments, together with poor analysis of the East Asian NIE experience, have led to an emphasis on quantitative expansion of primary schooling and diverted attention from the content of education.

The East Asian model of skill formation has attracted considerable attention from many countries (including Rwanda) hoping to find in it a route to their own economic salvation. In addition to an initial emphasis on mass primary education, key elements in this model include a deliberate articulation of education and training with industrialisation policies, highly centralised control of all aspects of education and a stress on values and moral education for national unity and discipline (Green, 1999). Both Oman (1996) and Riddell (1996) have challenged the validity of this model (in its entirety at least) in the face of altered global economic circumstances. In particular they suggest that the attraction of foreign investment through the availability of low-wage labour is less of a viable option. Wood (1994) argues that the longer-term perspective must emphasise skills enhancement and must aim to enhance high skills stocks. Oman and Riddell further point out that the nature of industrial enterprise is changing radically towards more flexible forms of production that demand different skills from traditional Fordist production lines: skills of creativity, problem solving, teamworking and the capacity for continuous learning and retraining. This in turn has implications for a radical reform of schooling and the curriculum to promote these skills and capacities.

The adoption of new technologies, most importantly ICT, is widely recognised as essential for economic development in the context of globalisation. Not surprisingly it receives particular emphasis in the leapfrogging approach to development (DfID, 2000a). Carnoy (1997) and Ashton & Green (1996) provide the warning that the introduction of advanced technologies into societies without adequate capacity to adapt them to their own needs can lead to de-skilling rather than up-skilling of the workforce. The promotion of indigenous technological capacity is a concern of several writers (Pigato, 2001; Haddad, 1997; Lall & Wignaraja, 1997; Riddell, 1996; Singh, 1994) and two broad conclusions arise from their studies. The first is that technological capacity will not emerge through a reliance on market forces alone but requires government intervention. The second is that a more

balanced expansion of all levels of education is essential, rather than a narrow focus on basic education alone.

*Contexts and Histories: a comparison of skills needs
identification in the two countries*

Rather than simply present the views of the informants in the two countries separately as to which skills should be prioritised for development, an approach that compares and contextualises their views is adopted. This is in keeping with the skills formation approach adopted in this research, which emphasises the contexts in which skills needs appear and are met. Points of similarity and difference were noted in the responses of informants in the two countries. Even when similarities in identified skills needs arise, however, it is important that attempts to address these needs take the particular national contexts into account. This position is developed further, below, starting with an overview in broad terms of 'skills shortages' and then looking at some domains for skills development that are prioritised by informants and national strategy documents.

Skill Shortages and Skill Bases. The general tenor of responses from Tanzanian informants is one of the identification of national skill bases to be developed or expanded, whereas Rwandan informants are more likely to talk in terms of the total or almost total absence of skills in many key areas. Thus, with some important exceptions, the Tanzanian concern is largely with the upgrading of existing skills and skills training provision to meet the new demands posed by greater engagement with the regional and global economy, together with a general expansion as the economy and its skills needs grow.

In contrast, Rwandans refer to the acute shortage or almost total absence of skills at all levels and in all sectors: from artisans and technicians to university lecturers and researchers; and in agriculture, the industrial and the service sectors, in both private and public concerns. They give the impression of, at best, a very weak national skill base that could be developed and, in many cases, of a dependency on skilled personnel imported from the region and beyond. The most obvious cause of this skills shortage in Rwanda is the 1994 genocide and, to a lesser extent, the post-genocide flight of refugees and those attempting to escape retribution.

But there are other factors which contribute to the greater skills shortage in Rwanda than in Tanzania. Amongst these is the higher proportion of the population engaged in agriculture and the attendant lower level of urbanisation. There has always been, therefore, a lower demand for the middle-level technicians and artisans such as electricians, plumbers and mechanics, more associated with urban than rural life. Perhaps partially as a consequence, that informal sector of mechanics, repairers, small-scale manufacturers and various service providers known in East Africa as the *jua kali* sector has not been a significant phenomenon in Rwanda. Since this sector

is also an important opportunity for entrepreneurial initiative and experience, its absence may go some way to explaining the absence of a significant Rwandan entrepreneurial class that several informants comment on. Some point out, however, that where entrepreneurial activity does exist in Rwanda it is often in the hands of non-Rwandans from neighbouring countries and suggest cultural explanations for lack of entrepreneurial initiative amongst Rwandans.

It is tempting to suggest a link between differences in the stocks of skills in the two countries and the envisaging of respective development trajectories: the elements of a leapfrogging approach in Rwanda and a more evolutionary approach in Tanzania. In a situation of major skill deficiencies, such as that in Rwanda, there is perhaps less of a tendency to be constrained by the existing structures when thinking about possible future strategies. In Tanzania, the existing body of skills is more likely to be seen as a foundation on which to construct future development and at the same time influence the shape of that development. In the absence of a strong foundation, there is greater scope to vary the shape of future construction. This is, of course, not to suggest that the existing skills situations of the two countries have been a major or even a significant determinant of development choices, merely to propose that they are a component of the framework within which options are considered.

Skills for Rural Development. In both countries, the need to develop agriculture is given a high priority either by interviewees or in development strategy documents. Both countries recognise the role of agricultural production as a key 'engine of growth', but whereas in Tanzania it is clearly seen as providing the broad base on which future development will take place, in Rwanda it takes on more of the nature of the platform on which development must initially stand, only to be able to make its leap into a very different kind of economic future.

While both countries report a low level of inputs and mechanisation in agriculture, the gross figures suggest that Rwanda compares poorly with Tanzania in both respects: for example, mean fertiliser application of 400 grams per hectare in Rwanda and 12,000 g/ha in Tanzania; or one tractor per 100 ha in Rwanda compared to 24 tractors per 100 ha in Tanzania. These data alone might suggest that the scope and need for agricultural modernisation in Rwanda is significantly greater but even these figures must be interpreted in their wider national contexts, such as the nature of the terrain in Rwanda, which often mitigates against intensive tractor use, and the different forms of organisation of rural communities in the two countries. The specific nature of the technology and agricultural knowledge and skills needed in the two countries (and, of course, in different regions within each) will differ. This emphasises the need, identified in strategy documents in both countries, for highly context-relevant research and extension work to support development of the sector, with associated higher-level skills development demands. These skills are commonly identified as being primarily science based, but it should

be remembered that the practice of agriculture, perhaps most particularly subsistence agriculture, is more than just the application of technical skills. It is also a set of socially and culturally embedded practices, so that awareness and sensitivity of the local sociocultural contexts will be demanded amongst those responsible for the successful implementation of change in agriculture.

A common (though not universal) perception of a major threat to agricultural development in Rwanda, noted in both documents and informant responses, is the high population density and the consequent shortage of agricultural land. This is exacerbated by degradation of the soil, through erosion resulting from poor practices, and is sometimes presented as a looming threat to Rwanda's capacity to feed itself. This increases the urgency in identification, on the one hand, of the need to increase agricultural productivity and, on the other, of encouraging diversification out of agriculture, removing population from rural to urban residence and occupation. Note that it is the perception of a land crisis that is as important as any real crisis in promoting these positions. Although such simple comparisons must be treated with caution, for example in relation to levels of dependence on agriculture, the amount of arable land per capita in Rwanda is actually very similar to that in Tanzania and Kenya. The impact of an impending land crisis, whether real or perceived, is to increase the sense of urgency in the increasing of agricultural productivity, but also to reduce confidence in relying on agriculture as a medium- to longer-term foundation for economic growth. Thus, the promotion of skills for a more modernised, productive farming goes hand-in-hand with a call for immediate training in skills to decrease dependence on agriculture, in the form of craft, artisan and entrepreneurial skills.

By way of contrast, Tanzania has a long tradition of prioritising agriculture and rural development over urban development, partly with a conscious though not always successful aim of discouraging rural-urban migration. Thus there is an element of continuity in its current strategy of using agriculture and agriculture-based industry as a primary engine of growth, and a considerable infrastructure available to support it and its attendant skills development needs. Other development opportunities are recognised, notably in mining and tourism, so that agriculture is actually seen as the dominant rather than exclusive component of a range of options. In comparison with Rwanda, it is interesting to note that this greater long-term reliance on agriculture exists despite a history of more precarious agricultural production in Tanzania. Food production in Rwanda may be inefficient but the country has not been faced with periodic droughts and food shortages on the same scale or with the same frequency as Tanzania. Rwandan informants suggest that one impact of this general availability of produce in Rwanda throughout the year has been to inhibit the development of basic food preservation and processing skills that are widely practised in neighbouring countries: skills such as drying and smoking of foods, for example. This is exacerbated by the low level of marketing opportunities within the country,

perhaps in turn partially a result of having only a small urban, wage earning population. Thus we have the identification by Rwandan informants of a group of what are seen as associated skills of processing and marketing, that are largely absent rather than just underdeveloped or not widely practised.

Skills for the Private Sector. In both countries the private sector, in commerce, manufacturing and services, is small. In Tanzania this is largely a legacy of an 'African socialist' government policy of state control of key enterprises through parastatal bodies. This was accompanied by an ideology of self-reliance based where possible on import substitution and seeking to protect local markets. Private enterprises did exist, particularly small-scale businesses, but these were limited and strictly controlled. There was little encouragement or opportunity for entrepreneurial initiative and little experience of production for a competitive market. One impact of this has undoubtedly been that both the standards of products and the efficiency of production and marketing have been low in comparison with global and even some regional standards. Recent years have seen the steady privatisation of the former parastatals and a general liberalisation of regulations to encourage both indigenous private enterprise and foreign capital. The low levels of entrepreneurial experience, private sector management skills and local sources of capital have meant that – in the eyes of some Tanzanian informants at least – these policies have led to many of the newly privatised enterprises being taken over by outside capital, notably from South Africa.

Rwanda has even less experience of private enterprise than Tanzania, for several reasons, including the murder or flight of much of the business community during the genocide. Tea and coffee marketing, which dominates export earnings, is in the hands of parastatal bodies, though these are to be privatised. Once again, the very small size of the non-agricultural sector has limited opportunity and experience in the development of skills needed for successful participation in the private sector, particularly in the face of regional and global competition.

Where productive skills do exist – and even in Rwanda there is a large body of rural cottage industry craft workers making a range of traditional items – informants in both countries recognise that greater regional and global trade will have implications for the standard of work produced. Success in markets demands standards that are comparable with those of one's competitors so that as the two countries' economies are deliberately opened to greater regional and international competition, product standards will no longer be a matter of national, internal definition. This in turn demands skill levels to match those of one's competitors. In both Rwanda and Tanzania, there are expressions of fear that local producers will be unable to meet these demands arising from globalisation. In some cases these are accompanied by calls for protection of local markets; in others there is greater confidence that product and skill levels can be raised, even if only in certain niche markets that must be identified.

Skills for the Public Sector. There is an explicit concern in the strategy documents of both countries to promote 'good governance', although the meaning of this is not discussed in much detail. What is certainly true in both countries is the recognition that the role of government will be different, particularly in its relationship to a more marketised, less centrally controlled and more globally engaged economy. This itself may demand new types of skills. Tanzanian informants make more references to the need for policy making, analysis and decision making skills and were particularly aware of their importance in a context of greater globalisation and international contact and cooperation. Rwanda, certainly through its strategy documents, if less so through the informants that were interviewed, recognises too that a 'new order' in government is required, although for more complex reasons than in Tanzania that will be discussed below. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the development of public sector skills received such little mention from informants.

Undoubtedly, the key difference in this respect between Tanzania and Rwanda is that the former is undergoing a radical change in the demands on the public sector against a background of considerable relative political and social stability over a long period of time. In contrast, Rwanda is facing the demands of the same 'new model' as it emerges from a traumatic experience of total political and social breakdown. Government has had to be rebuilt in Rwanda, not just adjusted. The new Government appears to have accepted a model for itself of being a facilitator rather than a provider, particularly in relation to the economy, and of adopting a less hands-on role in some domains than has previously been the case. That is, it has accepted this model, at least in principle, as that which will guide its own reconstruction, whereas Tanzania is faced with the much more difficult job of effecting a transition in existing government and public administration. In Rwanda these were hit at least as hard as any other by the genocide and the skills shortages in this domain may be seen as just part of a total picture of skills destruction during that event.

The genocide has, however, had other impacts relating to public governance which form an interesting comparison with Tanzanian experience and perceptions, but which are better discussed under a different heading.

Skills for Civil Society. The effective functioning of civil society can be seen as the other half of the good governance formula. This is stated quite explicitly in the Tanzanian *Vision 2025* document, which refers to the need to ensure that 'people are empowered with the capacity to make their leaders and public servants accountable'. It is recognised that 'good governance' is more than a set of technical skills among public servants, important as these may be. These skills must be practised within a 'culture of accountability' and good governance cannot in fact be realised without skills and opportunities for democratic participation amongst the populace as a whole. These statements within *Vision 2025* have to be understood against a background of perceptions

that Tanzania's 'national unity, social cohesion, peace and stability', that it has established and enjoyed since independence, may be in a process of decline, with 'corruption and other vices' as part of the evidence for this. Holding on to and reinforcing these threatened achievements is particularly problematic at a time when significant changes towards 'political and economic pluralism' are taking place. Tanzania does in fact have a tradition of encouraging community participation, but this was very much within a framework of central control and one-party politics that has ultimately contributed to the cynicism and corruption that is now seen to be part of the problem. Thus the 'traditional' community participation skills may not serve in a country giving greater emphasis to the market, private enterprise and multiparty politics. The development of 'community spirit' remains a key target but a new need to balance this with 'individual initiative' is noted, hinting at a source of tension that may arise during the social and economic transitions that are envisaged.

The promotion of greater civil participation in Tanzania is largely discussed in terms of 'mindset' and 'culture' rather than skills, and a similar position is common in Rwanda. The context here is significantly different, however. In Rwanda, the fundamental concern derives from perceptions of root causes of the genocide. Civil society participation is not seen in terms of enabling good governance as such, but in terms of the need to rebuild completely the basis for social cohesion and national unity and to try to ensure that the events of 1994 can never happen again. Thus there is not the perception of a base on which to build, or a situation to rescue from decline, as in Tanzania, but a need for a radical reformulation of the basis of community. The genocide is seen as having been facilitated by a tendency for Rwandan individuals to follow authority blindly rather than make their own decisions. The development of independent and critical thinking skills is therefore identified to counter this and so these skills are explicitly given a political role as well as one in supporting the new entrepreneurial economy, which is where it tends to be identified in the Tanzanian context. At the same time the need is recognised for more specific citizenship and political education, both formally and non-formally delivered, in both countries. Some of the content of this education will be specific to the perceived needs of each country (such as reconciliation in Rwanda) but there is common ground in the idea of raising awareness of civil rights and responsibilities.

The development of skills for effective participation in civil society might be interpreted as a purely 'internal' concern for each country rather than one that has relevance to a study focusing on globalisation. It is important to note, however, how these skills are located in the overall agenda of development within the context of globalisation, in documents and informants' responses from both countries. In the case of Tanzania, development strategy, particularly economic development strategy, is now overtly cast in the context of global developments and global competition, in contrast with the more isolationist, self-reliant, development approach of earlier years. Good governance and an 'empowering culture' are essential parts of this strategy,

and, as discussed above, these in turn require a populace with the skills to engage actively in political and civil life. From the informants, an even more direct link was made with the argument that increased contact with the outside political and business worlds demands a more sophisticated knowledge of rights and responsibilities amongst the Tanzanian population if they are not to be exploited.

From Rwanda, similar arguments about the nature of society necessary for successful engagement with globalisation are also heard in support of the promotion of political and citizenship skills, but globalisation also appears in a different role, in an argument that is linked once again to the genocide. This begins with the belief that the introverted, isolationist nature of Rwandan society was a key factor that allowed the genocide to take place. A greater openness to the outside world, through economic and political activity, is therefore an important means of preventing the same conditions that fostered the genocide from arising again. A critically reasoning, rational and empowered citizenry, aware of its civil and political rights, is further seen as essential for the maintenance of such an open society, one that cannot again be manipulated by the political elite. Thus, greater regional and global exchange opportunities are given a political role in encouraging national stability. The urgency of promoting national coherence and unity is clearly much greater in Rwanda than in Tanzania in view of its recent history. It can be argued that building a new base for social stability is a prerequisite for any economic development, whether cast in a localised or a globalised mould. Some informants refer to the great advantage that Rwanda has in this respect in the form of the 'returnees' that now make up a significant part of the political elite. These are people who have returned with experience of 'the outside world' to a greater extent than previous Rwandan elites and therefore provide just that external orientation that is now considered so essential. There is also the danger, however, that they will be a source of tension within Rwandan society in the contrasting cultural, linguistic and political characteristics that they bring, compared with the majority of the population.

Underlying almost all of the accounts of skills development discussed above is a perception that basic education and basic skills are fundamental to the successful promotion of other skills sets. The final part of the comparison looks, therefore, at the role of formal education and the skills it promotes in the development strategies of both countries.

Skills from Formal Education. The importance of basic skills, notably numeracy and literacy, is recognised in both countries as a foundation for other skills and basic education, both in primary schools and in adult education programmes, is given a high priority. In terms of adult literacy, Tanzania starts from a better position than Rwanda, thanks to large-scale literacy programmes in the past. The low level of adult literacy in Rwanda is recognised by several informants as a problem in developing agricultural and other basic vocational skills. Primary school enrolment figures are similar for both countries, with Rwanda

possibly having the advantage (although there are reservations about the reliability of these figures). It should be recognised, however, that current primary enrolment figures for Tanzania represent a very significant decline from a relatively high level in the mid-1980s. To some extent, Tanzania is trying to rebuild its primary education system and public confidence in it. Rwanda's figures probably still reflect the disruption of war and genocide, but a reasonably high popular demand has been maintained.

Secondary and higher education enrolments in both countries are unusually low, even by African standards. A considerable expansion in Tanzanian secondary school numbers has taken place in the last decade or so, but this is accounted for to a large extent by the increase in private schools. Tanzanian policy in the past has been to limit access to secondary schools and higher education to meet manpower planning projections only. Government policy currently accepts the need to provide more places at this level while also relying on private schools to meet much of the demand. Nonetheless, basic education is prioritised and secondary and higher-level expansion is addressed cautiously in development strategy documents. A demand-driven and market-oriented approach is being adopted to the expansion of post-secondary provision.

Rwandan policy towards secondary and higher education is not yet formalised but there is clearly a perception that enrolment levels must be raised. Private sector involvement in higher education is encouraged but there has also been considerable expansion in government provision, both in the expansion of student numbers at the National University of Rwanda and in the opening of several new post-secondary institutions. The overall impression is that Rwanda, while continuing to recognise the importance of basic education, is more consciously trying to expand at higher levels than Tanzania. Apart from an overall general feeling that higher-level enrolment rates are 'too low', two concerns may be driving this policy. The first is, once again, the serious lack of skills at all levels as a result of the genocide. It is not just a case, therefore, of producing skills at a level to replace natural wastage, plus some expansion, but of rebuilding skills stocks anew. Particular emphasis is placed by some informants, for example, on the need for secondary and post-secondary graduates to meet teacher training needs, but similar shortages could be identified in almost all areas. The second driving force behind this policy is likely to be the development goal of transforming Rwanda into a knowledge-based economy, with its attendant demand for high skills based on high levels of formal education. Although the Tanzanian *Vision 2025* recognises the future demand for highly skilled manpower and the need to gain an 'advanced technology capacity', the overall approach to this is much more gradualist than that of the equivalent Rwandan document.

Both countries recognise the role of formal education in supporting attitudinal changes in the populace – what the Tanzanian *Vision 2025* refers to as 'mindset transformation'. Both refer to the need to develop creativity and problem solving to meet the demands of external economic competition and

new forms of production and contrast this with existing mindsets that are oriented towards bureaucratic rule following. Both countries recognise the need for curriculum change to meet these new demands, with Tanzania in particular seeming to recognise that this will mean a major qualitative shift in the nature of educational provision. Science and technology and ICTs are identified by both as foci for educational attention. Skills in the latter are seen as central to global participation and accessing information and, as such, are seen as important across a wide range of occupations.

There is an awareness that the role of formal schooling goes beyond that of laying a foundation for an individual's occupational skill development. There is considerable reference in the literature to the notion of 'externalities', that is, 'the value of a well-educated workforce in general which helps the ability of a nation to adjust quickly to changes in technology and markets' (Kuruvilla & Chua, 2000). This is certainly recognised in documents consulted from both countries, but it still fails to capture the broader role that both documents and informants wish to entrust to education. Both countries expect education to play an important part in broader social and political agendas that do not directly, at least, address occupational skill formation. The detail of these agendas is country specific although common broad concerns include the development of common values as a basis for national unity, education for civic and political awareness and an enhanced awareness of cultural and historical heritage. Added to these may be a desire to use formal education to promote new sets of values and new ways of thinking that were discussed above. The possibilities for tensions, even conflict, in supporting these different agendas through education are obvious.

The third of the pressure points that provide a framework for our analysis is that which picks out the tension between global competition and social and economic inclusion and it is to this that we turn next.

Economic Competitiveness Versus Poverty Alleviation and Gender Equity

Globalisation and Poverty: from the literature

There are two broad schools of thought about the relationship between globalisation and poverty. Some authors such as Amin (1997), Castells (1993), Chossudovsky (1997) and Hoogvelt (1997) argue that the effects of the introduction of new forms of production based on ICTs and the intensification of financial flows between parts of the globalised world have been to create greater inequality within and between countries. In contrast, DfID (2000a) suggests that there is no systematic relationship between globalisation and inequality, or more precisely between openness and inequality and growth and inequality. This view is shared by the World Bank (2000) and by Collier & Dollar (2002). It is argued that whereas the world's richest countries have continued to grow in the last decade, the world's two most populated

countries, China and India, have accelerated their growth rates over the last 2 years whilst many of the world's poorest countries, including those of sub-Saharan Africa, have stood still or have experienced negative growth. This has contributed to an overall decline in inequality between countries. It is argued that if countries at the margins, whose incomes have declined over the last 20 years, were to become more integrated into the global economy and improve their economic performance, then global inequality and levels of poverty will fall but that if they do not they are likely to rise.

On the one hand, the goals of poverty reduction and economic growth are complementary as poverty reduction in the long term will depend on achieving economic growth. On the other hand, it is possible to detect an unresolved tension in the development literature between education and training policies and priorities to alleviate poverty and those required for global competitiveness. At present donors channel the vast majority of their aid for education (about 80% in the case of DfID) on meeting the development targets to eliminate poverty and reduce gender inequality. There is, however, also awareness amongst donors and multilateral agencies of the need to develop those skills required by countries in order to foster global competitiveness. These include skills that increase the individual's capacity to engage in non-routine, problem solving tasks, with less supervision and to learn quickly, to meet the demands of new, more flexible forms of production (World Bank, 1999). The World Bank points out the need for lifelong learning, suggesting an approach to skills formation that goes beyond a focus on basic education. DfID (2000a) similarly recognises the importance of lifelong learning and of post-primary education, advocating a sector-wide approach to funding that also takes account of the need for secondary and tertiary levels of skill in a globalised world.

Skills for Poverty Alleviation in Rwanda and Tanzania

Because of their status as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC), both Rwanda and Tanzania have been obliged to produce a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in order to qualify for debt relief under the HIPC initiative. These papers provide the clearest statements of the respective Governments' approaches to poverty alleviation. Although the PRSPs have been developed within the overall framework of the countries' visions for national development, there are clear gaps between the implications for skills development contained in the PRSPs and those contained in the vision documents; and between the PRSP implications and the skills required for globalisation identified by our informants. This illustrates precisely the tensions implied in our third pressure point. These differences may be summarised in the form of various policy tensions:

1. *Skills to meet development targets versus other skills required for short-term poverty reduction.* The objectives of the PRSPs are more narrowly focused on meeting

the international development targets through increasing enrolments and, to a lesser extent, improving quality through the provision of textbooks and buildings. By way of contrast, the skills suggested by the participants involve changes in the *content* of learning as well, including a greater emphasis on generic and life skills, agricultural skills, political and citizenship skills for national unity and reconciliation, management and leadership skills.

2. *Skills for short-term poverty alleviation versus skills for developing long-term global competitiveness.* Implicit in the national visions and in the views of the informants is the view that poverty reduction depends on Rwanda and Tanzania becoming more globally competitive and that this involves both countries finding a niche in regional and global markets. Achieving this longer-term transformation, however, requires making short- to medium-term investments in human resources, including developing public, private and service sector skills, ICT skills, generic and entrepreneurial skills, professional, technical and other skills. This is especially the case in Rwanda, which, as a result of the genocide, has a more limited skills base on which to base its economic development and which has pursued a more ambitious leapfrogging model of development as well.

3. *Basic skills versus other skills required for global competitiveness.* The above differences are reflected in differing priorities regarding the sub-sectors and levels of the education and training systems that ought to be invested in, at least in the short to medium term. For the PRSPs, the emphasis is almost exclusively on basic education whereas for the national visions and in relation to the views of the research informants, the emphasis is also on expansion to secondary, vocational, tertiary education and the development of an ICT infrastructure.

4. *States versus markets – who should fund skill development?* Also linked to the above are differences in perspective as to who ought to fund short- to medium-term skills development priorities. The idea, implicit in the PRSPs, is that these sectors can only be expanded in the short term through an increase in private sources of finance. The national visions and the views of the informants, on the other hand, assume a more leading role for the State in funding higher levels of education and training, at least initially.

Although the two goals of poverty alleviation and economic competitiveness are in tension, it is possible to strike a balance between them. Indeed, we argue that striving to strike such a balance is absolutely necessary because at the end of the day the two goals are interdependent. Economic growth depends on stability cohesion and a sense of well-being amongst the population whilst poverty reduction can only really be achieved on the basis of long-term economic growth. This argument has implications for the tensions highlighted above. Rather than see them as irreconcilable, the art of government must be

to strike a balance between the extreme positions that they represent in a way that will ensure both poverty reduction and future economic growth.

Gender Equity and Skills for Globalisation in Rwanda and Tanzania

Women make up 50% of the populations of Rwanda and Tanzania. In Rwanda, however, women make up a majority of the adult population as a consequence of genocide. Up-to-date information does not exist about the gender composition of the labour force in both countries. In 1990, women comprised 49% of the labour force in both countries. Out of this figure, 98% of women are employed in agriculture with less than 1% in industry and 2% in the service sector. In Tanzania 90% are employed in agriculture, less than 1% in industry and about 8% in the relatively larger service sector (World Bank, 2002). Figures do not exist for women's participation in the informal sector. Evidence from our research informants suggests that in Rwanda, an effect of the genocide has been to increase the proportion of women in the labour force. Women are now also expected to undertake many jobs traditionally reserved for men. Furthermore, a high proportion of households (34%) are headed by women (Government of Rwanda, 2001) compared to 14% in Tanzania (United Republic of Tanzania, 2000b). In both countries female-headed households are more likely to be poor than male-headed ones. In both countries women are generally perceived to be poorer than men.

Many of the benefits and risks facing women in relation to globalisation that were identified in the above analysis will be of relevance for women in Rwanda and Tanzania, given that the two Governments are committed to pursuing policies of encouraging foreign direct investment in manufacturing, the diversification of agriculture and the growth of the service sector. Women are likely to play a leading role in garment manufacturing and in an expanding service sector, for example. Women could also potentially benefit from a modernised agricultural sector in both countries, and the development of niche markets in exotic agricultural produce and crafts. Women also potentially face the risks associated with globalisation, such as discrimination in the labour market, being forced out of traditional occupations through agricultural modernisation and suffering from exploitation in the workplace.

Some progress has been made in recognising the key role of women in relation to development in the global era. Rwanda, for example, does have a Ministry of Gender, Family and Social Affairs whilst Tanzania has a Ministry of Community Development, Women and Children. Rwanda also has had a gender action plan in place since 2000, which links gender issues to the *Vision 2020* (Ministry of Gender & Women in Development, 2001). The Tanzanian *Vision 2025* (United Republic of Tanzania, 1999) states the achievement of gender equity in the economy, society and culture as a target by the year 2025. Both countries have made limited progress in implementing policies and laws aimed at gender equity. Both for example, are signatories of the Convention to End all Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Overall, however, gender

issues have a low profile in most of the key policy documents consulted for the research. There is also limited factual information available about the role and status of women in Rwandan and Tanzanian society.

If women and girls are to benefit from the opportunities afforded by globalisation and avoid the risks, then they require access to skills development opportunities at all levels. Data relating to women and education in the two countries show inequalities relating to adult and youth literacy rates, suggesting that adult non-formal education needs to target women and girls in particular. Although enrolment rates at primary level show no gender disparities, gaps do begin to appear at secondary level and above.

In our own research, many of the informants identified barriers impeding women from gaining the skills that would allow them to work their way out of poverty or to prepare them for economic change. The barriers included traditional attitudes which inhibit women from taking up certain vocations such as carpentry and mechanics. This in turn hinders women from gaining training and qualifications in these areas. The informants also reported gender stereotyping in schools and universities as a major problem which prevented girls and women taking up courses in science and technology. This resonates with the international experience, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Swainson, 1998). Finally, globalisation was seen to pose a threat at a cultural level including the way that women are represented in the global media and in pornographic images available on the Internet.

The potential cultural threat posed by globalisation was a theme identified by our informants more broadly than the issue of gender (although gender was very particularly identified in this respect) and it is to this that we briefly turn before offering some concluding remarks.

Research Data on Issues of Culture and Globalisation

A basic ambiguity or tension is noticeable in documents and interview responses in both countries in relation to the role of culture in development and, in particular, to the demands of greater engagement with the global economy. This tension is essentially between the recognition that certain cultural values and practices are incompatible with the demands of economic and social development and the desire to retain what are perceived as valuable aspects of traditional culture and thereby to ensure cultural continuity and a distinct cultural identity. Related to this is the recognition that greater exposure to the information flows available in the wider world are essential to successful participation in a globalising economy and yet these flows themselves pose a threat to important cultural values. The Internet, videos and television are criticised in both countries as sources of erosion of traditional values. There is some recognition, however, of the conflict between welcoming the access that these media give to global sources of information and the concern for their impact on moral and cultural values. This led some informants to call for a selective engagement with globalisation, based on a

belief that the economic and the cultural are separable, and choosing those aspects that promote economic development while rejecting those that are likely to undermine traditional value systems.

A culture of dependence is identified in both Rwanda and Tanzania as presenting a major hindrance to development. Amongst Rwandan informants this is described in terms of individuals waiting for others to do things for them or to make decisions for them rather than seizing the initiative. This is in turn associated with the blind following of authority, which is contrasted with a capacity for creative thinking and deciding what is right and wrong, and which is suggested as one of the factors that allowed the genocide to proceed with such awful effectiveness. The Tanzanian *Vision 2025* is particularly concerned with 'donor dependency', which it sees as a 'mindset' shared by both the leaders and the people of the country and which it too believes is eroding the capacity to take the initiative. The challenge, according to this document, is to transform a 'defeatist developmental mindset' into a 'progressive and development oriented culture'.

In more explicitly economic terms, dependency is contrasted with entrepreneurship, which is commonly portrayed in terms of a culture or of attitudes as much as specific skills. The cultural basis of entrepreneurial activity is rarely made explicit but is hinted at or implied in a variety of ways. Rwandan informants associated it with particular peoples within the region, implying that 'entrepreneurial spirit' has roots in group culture rather than individual mentalities. It is associated with attitudes such as 'opportunism, risk-taking, restlessness and a desire to succeed', which contrast with the accounts of Rwandan culture as one of subservience. In Tanzania, *Vision 2025* associates entrepreneurship with the idea of 'self-development', perhaps unwittingly suggesting that the collective, community-oriented culture of the country (which it also seeks to promote) is incompatible with entrepreneurial activity. Tanzanian informants also made the point that the entrepreneur flourishes in an economic culture of clients and markets, which is contrasted with the community and kinship-based culture of traditional productive activity.

Voices in both countries call for the preservation of certain traditional skills and values that it was felt are being eroded or forgotten, most notably skills of parenting and a commitment to the extended family and the community. Once again there are potential tensions here between a traditional espousal of discipline and parental authority on the one hand and a perceived need to encourage more independent and critical thought on the other.

Attitudes to traditional value systems in Rwanda have undoubtedly been affected deeply by the events of recent history. Although there is a desire for cultural continuity based on 'Rwandan values', there is also a recognition that some of these values played a significant part in promoting the genocide. The situation in Rwanda is seen as one that demands major social, political and cultural reconstruction. Many informants recognise that the foundation for this reconstruction has to be some set of values that will allow the people to regain a sense of pride in a Rwandan identity and, through this, a new sense of

national unity. Calls are made for the rediscovery of and re-education in genuine Rwandan traditional culture, but some of the returnees admit that they themselves are unfamiliar of what others might claim to be traditional Rwandan culture. The new openness to outside cultural influences, that is inherent in a greater global and regional involvement, is seen as a way of escaping from the introverted darkness of the past, but there is a parallel concern not to lose what there is of value in Rwandan traditions.

Tanzania approaches the issue of national cultural identity from a different perspective. There is a pride in what has been achieved in the area of national identity and social cohesion. There is a sense, however, of decay from an earlier 'golden age' in recent history, epitomised in *Vision 2025* as the 'set of fundamental moral, spiritual, ethical and civil values' encapsulated in the Arusha Declaration. This decay is variously described as an 'erosion of trust and confidence among the people' and 'cracks in social cohesion', indicated by an increase in 'corruption and other vices in society'. Although the document recognises the need for cultural and attitudinal changes in response to changes in the political and economic orientation of the country in the light of globalisation, it clearly suggests that there is in existence a sound foundation on which these changes can build.

Ultimately, both countries are suggesting that development requires more than just new economic policies and more than just technical skills. Development, but particularly development in this era of globalisation, is seen to pose what are effectively moral challenges. Success in a global competitive economy can only be achieved (as the experience of the East Asian NIEs suggests too) if there is a firm basis of national cohesion that draws on traditional sets of values as much as possible while accepting that cultural change must also occur.

Conclusions

It will be recalled from the beginning of this article that the two research hypotheses for the study were:

- Globalisation has radically different implications for skills development in low income countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania compared to Western industrialised countries and the newly industrialised countries of the Pacific Rim.
- Tanzania and Rwanda are likely to be similar in their responses to the four policy tensions or pressure points identified in the literature review.

With regard to the first hypothesis, it is clear that there are both similarities and differences in the implications of globalisation for skills development for low income countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania as compared to high income ones. The overall perception of globalisation in Rwanda and Tanzania is similar to the view of globalisation in the broader literature excepting that information about globalisation and its causes and effects is fairly limited to an urban, educated elite. Drawing out the views of other participants involved

greater probing around key issues related to globalisation from the literature. There were also differences in emphases, linked to the two countries' relatively weak position in relation to globalisation, the realities of extreme poverty and, in Rwanda's case, the recent legacy of genocide and war.

In this respect globalisation was perceived as containing both opportunities and threats for national development. Unlike the position in high income countries, the chief threat is of increasing marginalisation from the global economy, the dominance of foreign political interests and agendas and the 'swamping' of indigenous cultures. Rapid integration into the global economy was, therefore, seen as a priority by the majority of respondents balanced with a recognition of the immediate need in both country contexts to eradicate poverty and promote national unity. Like emerging models of the State elsewhere in the world the model that emerged in the context of this research is that of the 'facilitatory' and 'catalytic' State. In the case of Rwanda and Tanzania, where there is a relatively undeveloped private sector and where the needs of poverty reduction are so stark, the State must continue to play a leading role in tackling poverty through the provision of basic services. It must also act as a catalyst for economic growth through the development of an indigenous private sector and by prioritising public expenditure in areas that are likely to lead to competitive global advantage, including education and training. Like elsewhere in the world, there was a recognition by research participants that in pursuing these objectives the State needs to work in partnership with the emerging private sector, donors and with civil society. Crucially, however, in both cases, sustained investment in skills development will be impossible unless there is a reduction in the external debt and fairer terms of trade for the two countries in international markets. This point was reiterated by many of the research respondents.

Meeting the dual goals of economic competitiveness and poverty reduction poses special challenges to the governments of low income countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania and their partners in the international community. So too do the continued legacies left by colonial and postcolonial systems of education and training. Whereas in richer countries, the trend is to pursue a 'high skills' path to economic development, the sheer lack of skills at all levels of society and the demands of poverty alleviation mean that Rwanda and Tanzania must emphasise not only the development of high skills but skills at all points of the spectrum, including basic skills, agricultural skills and vocational and technical skills. Sheer lack of capacity in both the private and public sectors also underlines the need for the development of skills relevant to the rapid development of these sectors. The recent experience of genocide and war in Rwanda and the growing threat of ethnic division in Tanzania also draw attention to the need in these national contexts for the development of political and citizenship skills. Unlike many high income countries, poor countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania also suffer from a lack of a supportive environment required for a successful skills development strategy as we discussed earlier.

Finally, governments around the world, including those of many high income economies, face the challenges of removing barriers and increasing participation of girls and women in skills development opportunities; recognising the unique skills that girls and women bring to the development process; and removing barriers to their participation in labour markets. These challenges not only concern the realisation of equal rights for women and girls in the field of education, training and employment but overcoming them is crucial for both poverty reduction and economic competitiveness. In Rwanda and Tanzania, the need to address these challenges is especially acute because they must overcome deeply ingrained attitudes and values that deny them equal access to skills development and labour market opportunities, particularly in those areas that have traditionally been ascribed as a 'male' preserve. Women are also more likely to suffer from poverty and to feel the negative effects of economic globalisation in low income countries through being displaced from their traditional occupations on the land, in traditional crafts and in small industry. Overcoming barriers to women's participation in skills development provides a means for women to become empowered by giving them alternative routes out of poverty. Furthermore, the jobs that are created by economic integration of low income countries, especially those jobs within the service sector and some areas of manufacturing such as garment manufacturing, have provided opportunities for women to increase their incomes and achieve a measure of economic independence. Women and girls need to be given the skills to participate equally with men in these and other areas and to protect their rights as employees where these are threatened. In countries such as Rwanda and Tanzania, the education of women has a particularly large knock-on effect to society as a whole given the pivotal role of women as mothers and carers and as leaders within their communities and the evidence linking women's and girls' education to improvements in health and mortality rates and greater control over their own fertility.

Turning now to the second hypothesis, there are also similarities and differences in the responses of the two countries to the implications of globalisation and to the identified pressure points, although the similarities outweigh the differences. It should be clear from the preceding discussion that there is a good deal of overlap in the implications of globalisation for the two countries. Both countries share a similar economic status as low income, highly indebted countries, highly dependent on agriculture and suffering from extreme poverty. These factors in many important respects define their relationship with the forces of globalisation and lead to similarities in their capacities to put in place an appropriate skills development strategy.

There are, however, differences in their responses to globalisation. Firstly, there are differences in understanding the implications of globalisation itself. A recognition of Rwanda's relatively recent opening up to external influences and the lingering effects of genocide continue to affect the country's relationship with the outside world. They provide a unique and powerful set of motives for policy makers to globalise and to further open up their

economy and society as a means to overcome the effects of genocide whilst at the same time preserving those traditional values that are seen as critical for national unity and reconciliation. Secondly, the differing geographical, demographic and economic contexts of the two countries have led to the adoption of different developmental paths that we have characterised as a 'leapfrogging' and as an 'evolutionary' model respectively. Taken together, these factors lead to some differences in emphases in the skills required for development and have slightly different implications for the development of a skills development strategy in each country.

Individual country reports submitted to DfID (Tikly et al, 2002; Mukabaranga et al, 2002; Dachi et al, 2002) provide recommendations for skill development strategy development in the two countries of the study. It is our contention that much of any such set of recommendations must be specific to the country concerned. Nonetheless, we also feel that our study allows us to outline a broad skills development strategy that may have applicability in other low income countries, although this applicability and the specific interpretation of the strategy for any country must be the subject of further research in that country. The key elements of this strategy are presented below.

Key Elements of a Skills Development Strategy

A core vision. This vision should involving elements of a lifelong learning approach that have been tailored to local needs and contexts.

A proactive approach on the part of the State to skills development. The State must work to facilitate and catalyse the development of processes that will result in a coherent skills development strategy and must play a leadership role, in partnership with key stakeholders, in identifying and implementing skills development priorities.

A 'joined-up' approach to policy making. This means developing a national skills development strategy in relation to existing and future policy frameworks relating to poverty alleviation, economic development, human resource development policy, education and training, trade and industry, labour markets, industrial relations, etc.

Support the evolution of a skills development strategy with an appropriate legal framework. A skills development strategy relies on supportive legislation, e.g. in the fields of intellectual property rights

The identification of suitable intra-government structures to provide coherence and communication across sectors in relation to identifying and implementing skills development priorities.

A strategic approach to identifying and implementing skills development priorities that recognises and balances different perspectives and interests from the private sector, civil society and the donor community and different policy goals relating to poverty reduction, economic competitiveness and gender equity and national unity.

The identification and implementation of *appropriate mechanisms and tools for assessing skills development needs* in the formal and informal labour markets and in relation to future development priorities.

Ensure that the principles of *good governance* are applied and are adhered to in relation to skills development, e.g. all relevant stakeholders need to be included in policy making; capacity for implementing skills development priorities needs to be developed in the State, the private sector and civil society; and, decentralisation needs to be strengthened through management and leadership training at all levels and the elimination of mismanagement and corruption where this exists.

Find ways to *increase overall amounts of money dedicated to skills development priorities*. This should include increasing funds from both government and private sources.

Encourage private provision of education and training to increase overall capacity for skills development and to allow for other benevolent spin-offs such as technology transfer.

Harmonise external forms of support for education and training in terms of a *sector-wide approach* to funding.

Develop a balanced approach to education funding. We suggest an approach that seeks to meet the international development targets but also one that broadens the definition of basic education to integrate elements of vocational training and targeted support for secondary and tertiary education in key areas such as science and technology.

Find ways to promote *equity in skills development* through targeted support for groups most at risk of exclusion from skills development opportunities (including women and girls and the most impoverished sections of society).

Put in place an ICT strategy. A skills development strategy relies on a complementary *ICT strategy* that identifies and seeks to implement skills development priorities within this field.

Ensure that a national skills development strategy takes account of and is clearly linked to relevant *regional policies and frameworks* such as the Southern

African Development Community protocol on education and training and an emerging regional qualifications structure. The aim of increased regional cooperation ought to be to ensure greater compatibility and mobility between national systems of education and training and to provide greater efficiency through placing expensive training and research facilities on a regional footing.

Put in place measures to *reverse the effects of the so-called 'brain drain'*. More research is required into the causes and effects of the brain drain and ways to address it drawing on international experience.

Identify key priorities for the education and training sector to address. We suggest for priorities building management and leadership capacity; mainstreaming gender issues; reviewing the provision of vocational; education and training; curriculum reform at all levels; greater emphasis on ICT in education; the development of national curriculum and qualifications frameworks.

Develop a *programme of research and consultancy* to support the development of a skills development strategy. This ought to involve building capacity for indigenous researchers and consultants.

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